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[Keith Broaders]

3:22 PM (27 minutes ago)
to me

Proposal 1: Require six of the nine Justices to agree before decisions are rendered
Commentary
This proposal has an intuitive appeal: it aims to ensure that only decisions with broad judicial consensus become binding national law. However, it runs directly into serious constitutional and practical problems.
First, the Constitution does not prescribe voting thresholds for the Supreme Court of the United States. Article III establishes the Court but leaves its internal decision-making to long-standing judicial practice. For over two centuries, a simple majority has sufficed. Changing that rule would likely require a constitutional amendment, not a statute.
Second, a supermajority requirement would produce systemic paralysis. In contentious constitutional cases—precisely the cases most in need of resolution—deadlock would become common. Lower-court splits would persist indefinitely, leaving different constitutional rules in force in different parts of the country.
Third, this rule would empower a minority veto. Four Justices could block resolution of any issue, even where the Constitution demands clarity. This risks undermining the Court’s essential function: saying what the law is, not merely what nearly everyone agrees upon.
In short, while well-intentioned, this proposal would likely weaken judicial authority and constitutional stability rather than strengthen them.
Proposal 2: Permit state legislatures to review and nullify Supreme Court opinions
Commentary
This proposal is far more radical—and far more constitutionally problematic.
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause explicitly provides that the Constitution and laws made pursuant to it are the “supreme Law of the Land.” Since John Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, judicial review has been understood as a core function of the federal judiciary. Allowing state legislatures to nullify Supreme Court decisions would directly contradict that structure.
Historically, similar ideas have been tried—and rejected. The Nullification Crisis of the 1830s demonstrated that permitting states to override federal authority leads not to constitutional balance, but to constitutional breakdown.
More fundamentally, this proposal would invert the separation of powers. State legislatures are political bodies; Supreme Court opinions are meant to apply constitutional law uniformly. Allowing states to veto Court decisions would fragment constitutional meaning into fifty competing interpretations, destroying national legal coherence.
If states could nullify Supreme Court rulings, there would be no effective constitutional referee. Rights would exist—or not—depending entirely on geography. That result is incompatible with a functioning constitutional republic.
Bottom Line
Both proposals arise from a legitimate frustration with judicial overreach. But neither aligns with the Constitution’s actual design.
The first would paralyze the judiciary.
The second would dissolve constitutional supremacy.
If the concern is that the Court has exceeded its proper role, the Constitution already provides lawful remedies: constitutional amendments, jurisdiction-stripping within limits, impeachment for true misconduct, and—most importantly—better civic understanding of the Court’s limited authority.
Structural reform must reinforce constitutional order, not replace it with instability.
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